

4

The Challenge of Reason: From Certainty to Truth

Cinzia Ferrini

1 What Is ‘High’ and What Is ‘Low’ in the Significance of Reason¹

Hegel’s introductory discussion of “Reason” (§C. (AA); Chapter V), which focuses on reason’s “Certainty and Truth,” is as important as it is brief and allusive. Careful consideration reveals that in “Reason” Hegel addresses a much broader array not only of philosophical, but also of historical and natural-scientific views and issues than has been recognized previously.

Right at the outset Hegel underscores the novelty of the new figure that has arisen for consciousness, namely reason, which contrasts sharply with the significance of the relation between self and world central to Section B, “Self-Consciousness” (*PS* 132.16–133.5/*M* 139–40). Up to now all the real finite world of both nature and consciousness’s own action and actual doing appeared to self-consciousness as the *negative* of its free and independent essence. To affirm its own nature, it had to struggle *against* reality. It took the world’s existence primarily for its will: the world was something desired, but with an independent existence of its own that had to be worked on and transformed to make consciousness self-assured of its own independent reality. In Section B, Hegel’s use of the verbs to desire (*begehren*) and to work on (*bearbeiten*) indicates the realm of the practical versus the theoretical, which is indicated by the verb to understand (*verstehen*); indeed, before acquiring reason, self-consciousness does *not* “understand” the world (*PS* 132.30/*M* 140). In the last figure experienced – Unhappy Consciousness – the absolute essence, i.e., the being-in-itself (*das Ansichsein*), did not inhabit the earth; it was an object of faith as a *transcendent* “beyond.” As consciousness that is reason, however, self-consciousness has returned into itself, and it now can convert that negative relation to otherness into a positive one: now “being” (*Sein*) means “what is its own” (*Seinen*). This implies reverting from the practical attitude of considering nature as something that it is for itself to the

theoretical-cognitive approach of meaning, perceiving, and understanding, though now the perception and experience of things are no longer something consciousness undergoes, which simply *occur* (*geschehen*) to it. Rather, consciousness now makes *its own* observations; it arranges and performs *its own* experiments (PS 137.24–25/M 145). Therefore, the world itself constitutes the “here” and “now” of reason, though no longer according to the merely theoretical significance of being (*Sein*) as the mine that is meant (*mein, meinen*) which merely “happened” to be here and now to Sense-Certainty, which regarded nature only as *das Meinige*, devoid of any independent self. Hegel writes that self-consciousness, as reason, is certain of itself as reality, meaning that everything actual is nothing alien to it, and its thought (*Denken*) is itself *immediately* the actuality of the world (PS 132.27–28/M 139). At the beginning of the sub-section of Chapter V dedicated to “Observing Reason,” Hegel clarifies the meaning of the observational activity of reason against the background of the positive relation to reality sketched above, by stressing that at this stage to understand the world involves *will*:

reason *wants* to find and to have itself (*will sich . . . finden, und haben*) as an object that is (*als seyenden Gegenstand*), in an actual, sensuously present manner. (PS 138.11–12/M 146).²

This active and intended “discovery” of the world is rooted in the “universal *interest*” of reason in it.³ This is a key point, for it *immediately* links the “changeable” (the particularities of the empirical manifold of appearances) with the “unchangeable” (the permanence and universality of reason’s will to find and have herself in a sensuous way) by *understanding* the real world. It underscores that what stands before self-consciousness no longer means *an* “other” that confronted consciousness; it has become the knowing subject’s *own* “other,” not just for us, but *for* consciousness, which is now certain of its presence in the world.

However, this essential feature contains an inner opposition. On the one hand, it allows us to understand why, a couple years later, Hegel presents the figure of Reason as the highest unification of the knowing of the object as an “other” (that along its theoretical path was in general first meant, then perceived, and then apprehended by the understanding) and the practical knowing of the self, or consciousness of the world of the finite spirit, developed by self-consciousness in Section B.⁴ Similarly, at the outset of “Spirit” (PS, §BB, Chapter VI) Hegel recapitulates the immediately preceding movement of the coming-to-be of spirit. Here he states: “as immediate consciousness of the *being-in-itself* and the *being-for-itself*, as unity of consciousness and self-consciousness, spirit is consciousness that *has reason*” (PS 239.31–33/M 264–5). On the other hand, as Hegel will say in an 1806 lecture fragment on the *Phenomenology*, reason is self-consciousness that has not yet grasped either itself or its object as spirit (Forster 1998, 610): reason is unaware of being “knowing spirit.”⁵ At the conclusion of “Observing Reason,” indeed, Hegel states that the meaning of the result of the itinerary of reason’s observational activity is recognizing the reality of self-consciousness, though as an immediate, sensuous object to be perceived. He points out, then, that the result

has a *twofold* significance. The first is the ‘high’ one recalled above, that Hegel calls “its true meaning,” because it completes the outcome of the preceding movement of the entire figure of Self-Consciousness (*PS* 190.31–33/*M* 208). The second is the ‘low’ one of observing the world aconceptually; that is, by taking and resolving the real presence (*Dasein*) of spirit into a purely objective thinghood. Interestingly enough, as we will see below (chapter 5, §2.3), in his 1762 *Emile*, Rousseau (1969, 4:526) had already warned against the danger of knowing the nature of the human spirit by principles that would *immediately* proceed from sensible to intellectual objects, thus producing an incomprehensible metaphysics, whereas one should follow only the authority of one’s own experience and intellectual progress and gauge men solely by their actions, that is, from the standpoint of human history.⁶ In the same vein, here Hegel claims that reason is in truth “all reality” *only in the concept*, not in lifeless objects of outer reality such as bones or brain fibers, the observation of which dispenses with the concept (*PS* 191.25–26/*M* 209). This final remark extends the justification of the charges of formalism advanced in the “Preface” against a certain kind of philosophy of nature (Hansen 1994, 293–307) such as that espoused, for example, by Schelling in his *Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie* (1801, §152), where, following Steffens, polarities of inorganic, lifeless nature were taken as “directly represented by or equal to” degrees of organic, living nature.⁷ Harris (1999, 41) observes that, “the ‘science of experience’ is the great corrective for all varieties of ‘formalism’.” Indeed, in the “Preface,” Hegel reacts against the violence suffered by the quiet surface of sensuous data through such associations, “which imparts to them the illusory aspect (*Schein*) of a semblance of the concept but saves itself from expressing the main thing: the concept itself or the meaning of the sensuous representation” (*PS* 37.18–20/*M* 30).⁸

This first observational step of reason, therefore, is characterized by the conjunction of the ‘highest’ and the ‘lowest’; the depth which spirit brings forth from within itself is joined with the ignorance and “crude” instinct of a consciousness that observes the world, expecting to take things truly insofar as they are taken as sensuous things opposed to the “I” (*PS* 138.28–29/*M* 147). This will prove to be a “false manifestation.” Reason’s actual activity, Hegel contends, “contradicts” such a belief (*PS* 138.30–31/*M* 147), for in fact she “cognizes” (*erkennt*) things, transforming their empirical sensuousness into concepts. According to the paradigm of the living substance that is both being and subject, the movement of positing oneself set forth in the Preface,⁹ the “becoming” of rational observing consciousness is its actual activity. This means that the path of reason is to develop what she is within herself, showing to us, through her development, her own inner nature, her *an sich*, and thus becoming for herself what she essentially is.¹⁰

We shall examine this “contradiction” between the belief of Observing Reason when she looks upon things seeking to possess in thinghood the consciousness only of herself, and the truth revealed to us by her activity. To understand the significance of this double characterization, however, we must understand the chapter’s place in the overall economy of Hegel’s book; thus we shall begin

with some brief remarks concerning the phenomenological transition to “Reason.”¹¹

1.1 The transition to reason

As Hegel himself points out at the very beginning of “The Certainty and Truth of Reason,” the dialectic of Consciousness (of meaning, perception, and understanding) had destroyed the certainty that the being-other of the thing constituted an alien, independent essence, indifferent to the knowing subject.

From the being-other of the object as something alien to consciousness we passed to the object as self-consciousness’s *own other* in “Lord and Bondsman,” where through service and work, external reality was transformed by obedience and by renouncing individual choice (see above, chapter 2). The freedom and universality of self-consciousness represented by Stoicism and Skepticism, in turn, achieved independence and liberation from the practical and theoretical forms of the self’s bondage: affections and desires (in “Stoicism”), and reliance on sense data, on valid rational procedures and argument, and on absolute rules and norms (in “Skepticism”). In this way self-consciousness was subjectively certain of itself as being essential, as pure universal spirituality, though only *against* an internal and external reality to which it denied all value and significance (see above, chapter 3).

The final form of self-consciousness was the internal splitting of self-consciousness into a dual-natured being: on the one side, an entirely individual, changing consciousness that daily experiences what it knows as a vanishing, transient internal and external reality; on the other side, an unchanging consciousness that is projected out of the real world into a transcendent, supersensible “beyond,” which appears to the changeable individual consciousness to have a different essential nature. The mediation between the consciousness of singular independent individuality and the consciousness of the supersensible unchangeable occurred thanks to the intermediation of a clergy, a Church (Hyppolite 1974, 212–15), along a confessional path of penance through renunciation, self-alienation, and negation of the individual will, though only because the individual will knows itself as conjoined to a *universal* will.¹² This turn of the singular will from waiting to be redeemed by a transcendent divinity toward “actively bringing” its subjective point of view into line with God’s universal will (Pinkard 1994, 77) is a path marked by references to the Lutheran inwardness of evil and power of earthly things. Hegel’s *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* make clear that the Reformation (with the doctrine of justification by individual grace and substituting consubstantiation for transubstantiation) spread the consciousness that the Host was simply a wafer, and the Saint’s relics were merely bones.¹³ It appears that in Hegel’s reconstruction it was necessary first to defeat the superstition backed by the Church that associated superhuman virtues with material things (via magic and miracles) in order to treat *both* nature and subjectivity according to their own proper principles: to recognize that the laws of nature were the only link among phenomena and to feel

at home in this new world established by the *independent authority* of the *certainty* of rational self-consciousness (cf. *VGP* 9:63.978, 64.985–88, 65.45–66.52). This was, indeed, *also* a path marked by Jesuitical casuistry which, shaking any inward fixed determination about what was evil and what was good, made the elements of the will vacillate: hence it was for spirit itself to be nothing but pure universal activity. According to the historical background retraced in the *Lectures* and presupposed in these pages of the *Phenomenology*, this path reached its climax after the religious wars with the principle of the *freedom of consciousness*.¹⁴

In the *Phenomenology* Hegel accounts for self-consciousness passing into an immediacy that is “Reason” (Kalenberg 1997, 61ff.) in a single, cryptic sentence.¹⁵ Note, however, that starting from the “struggle for absolute liberation by the consciousness divided against itself,” the being-other “that has become something only for consciousness,” vanished also for consciousness itself (*PS* 133.20–22/*M* 140). In this way, the certainty has arisen for consciousness that, *in its particular individuality*, it has being absolutely within itself, or it *is* all reality: it is *reason* that comes to be the unity of thought with the other, the medium or the substantial basis of two traditionally separated extremes: consciousness and the externality of natural things.¹⁶ What stands before consciousness is no longer a beyond with a different substantial nature, as was the case with “Unhappy Consciousness.” Contrary to Kant’s perspective, the realization of the concept of freedom now determines a *new* (in respect to the Understanding) cognition of nature. To underscore the meaning of inserting “Self-Consciousness” between “Understanding” and “Reason,” Hegel writes that for self-consciousness “it is as if now for the first time the world had come into being.”¹⁷ Hence that which has the ‘highest’ significance of thought is reconciliation (*Versöhnung*) between the thinking self of reason and the natural world.¹⁸

2 The Standpoint of Reason: or When Certainty Is Not Yet Truth

2.1 The idealism of reason

The lowest aspect of reason is brought about by the singularity and immediacy that characterizes this shape of natural consciousness. When Hegel first introduces reason, he underscores that consciousness grasped the thought that the *single* individual consciousness is in itself (*an sich*) absolute essence (*PS* 132.1–2/*M* 139). A few paragraphs later he explains that this means the simple category of the “I” is the (only) pure essentiality of all there is (*PS* 134.20–24/*M* 142). The refrain is that individual reason is certain of being *all* reality, of being *every* “in-itself and essential being” (*Ansich und Wesen*). Nevertheless, natural consciousness experiences its new configurations as being *immediately* present, without noticing the processes of mediation that generate them. These processes constitute the truth of consciousness, and the justifications of its forms, though initially only for us. Thus, to the extent that the phenomenological path demonstrates that the

immediate appearance of a new form of consciousness is nothing but an abstraction from the actual movement that was in fact present (though apparent only for us) in the experience of the preceding figure, bringing the new one into being, then reason, with her motto: “I am I, my object and my essence is I” (PS 134.4/M 141), appears immediately on stage

only as the *certainty* of that truth. She merely *asserts* that she is all reality, but does not herself comprehend (*begreift*) this; for that forgotten path is the comprehension of this immediately expressed assertion . . . The idealism that does not exhibit (*darstellt*) that path but begins with this assertion is therefore, likewise, pure *assurance* which does not comprehend itself, nor can it make itself comprehensible to others. It pronounces an *immediate certainty*. (PS 133.28–37/M 141)

This passage repeats some polemical warnings against inadequate forms of intelligibility (subjective and objective idealism) of the initial appearance of a new world.¹⁹ Hegel stresses that the phrase, “reason is the certainty of consciousness that it is all reality,” is the way in which “idealism” expresses this new figure.²⁰ It is worth noting that the *allness* to which Hegel here refers signifies also a defective kind of cognition that typifies the initial stage of observing reason, affecting her representational way of thinking. In the way in which, for Hegel, “idealism” expresses this certainty: “all reality is I,” or “I am all reality,” *allness* is not a true, speculative, rational totality, but merely the abstract form of it, as we may elucidate by focusing on the *logical* form (all A are B) of this initial self-judgment of reason (cf. Chiereghin 1994, 97–100).

Beginning in the *Jena Logic*²¹ Hegel treated a kind of judgment where the predicate is not a true universal, the content of the predicate is made up of particulars related only externally, and the subject, which contrasts with its object as something fixed, is thus only reflected immediately into itself (cf. *Enc.* [1817], §328). A passage in the 1804–05 *Logic* states that in the “judgement of allness” the subject is not strictly speaking a self-determining (concrete) universal incorporating all its constituent moments, as, for instance, in the speculative proposition: “the actual is the universal,” where the actual as subject is *dissolved* in its predicate thus dissolving also the fixed difference between the two terms (PS 44.17–21/M 39),²² but a particular which is now extended to all instances of that particular as happens with a generic predicate. Thus, it is the *finitude* of both sides, the subject and the predicate, that is, their permanent difference according to the principles of identity and non-contradiction, which typifies both representational thinking (*Vorstellungen*) and “idealism.” In being certain of its singularity *directly* joined with the allness of reality, in the sense of the universal subject “I” in immediate unity with the immediacy of being, the self-consciousness that is reason in fact *logically* judges and determines itself in the lowest way, because it looks at perceived things to find *them* in the form of a universal, which turns out to be nothing but a mere act of appropriation in the form of an abstract ‘mine’: “idealism” with its “I am I” gives *direct expression* to reason’s certainty, that, in comparison with the “I” which is an object for me, any other object whatever is a *non-being*, something inessential (cf. PS 133.6–14/M 140).²³ At the same time,

despite its claims, “idealism” remains within the limits of the representations of a finite subject, insofar as it posits (*setzt*) the cognizant subject as dependent on this relation with finite objects. In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (first delivered in 1805–06) Hegel defines the subjective idealism that arises with modernity in terms of self-consciousness or self-certainty as being all reality and truth, which he views as proceeding from Locke’s appeal to experience and perception of the finite as source of truth (see below, note 37). He identifies its worst (*schlechteste*) formulation in the motto “all the objects (*Gegenstände*) are our representations” (*Vorstellungen*; H&S 3:364: “conceptions”), which he traces back to Berkeley and regards as a form of Skepticism, as he holds in the *Phenomenology* (cf. MM 20:270/H&S 3:363–4, PS 136.23–30/M 144).

Though it may be useful to think of Schelling’s spinozistic claim in his *Darstellung meines Systems* (§35), that no one individual thing contains the reason for its own existence, because everything is identical according to the essence,²⁴ interpreters agree in reading these references as drawing from Fichte’s first *Wissenschaftslehre* and his *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre*,²⁵ where the form of subjectivity is the fundamental condition for the explanation of experience, the “I am” is the standpoint of the free rational agent in contrast to things, and the self is nothing more than the product of its free activity (Beiser 2002, 278–88). It is worth recalling here, however, that at the time of the polemical debate about the founders of the “newest philosophy,” Fichte was regarded as an “idealist” because he knew (with the same certainty with which one knows of oneself, i.e. with the *highest certainty possible*) that no thing actually exists out of him and that all the things were his own product, which he constructed and produced through the intellectual intuition in his own pure “I” (Nicolai 1801, 4).

Here Hegel’s reference to the ‘lowest’ status of non-being (*Nichtsein*) that idealism bestows upon all the objects of self-consciousness other than the “I” recalls the polemical note against the mistreatment of natural objects in Fichte’s system, which explicitly involved Kant’s transcendental idealism (*Diff.*, *GW* 4:8). Indeed, as noted above, at this stage the object of knowing is determined for consciousness as the thing that is also the unity of the “I” and being, which is *categorial thought* as such.²⁶

Already in the *Differenzschrift* (1801), Hegel praised the significance of Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories, which Hegel esteemed as pure activities of thought that are also objective determinations. Excepting the modal categories, Kant’s deduction of the forms of understanding expressed concretely “the principle of speculation,” namely, the “identity of subject and object.” Indeed, Hegel stressed that Kant’s theory of the understanding was “baptized” by reason (*Diff.*, *GW* 4:6), though he further noted that when Kant conceived the rational identity of thought and otherness, of subject and object, as reason, this crucial identity vanished, because Kant analyzed it as subjective and formal. Indeed, Kant treated reason with the tools of *abstract* thought, the understanding. Confined to the practical, ideas of reason were opposed to determinate beings. According to Hegel, this was the root of the contrasting result of Kant’s first *Critique*: for the understanding, objective determinations were always conditioned, though they

had empirical reality; while for reason, objective determinations were absolute, but had no reality (*Diff.*, *GW* 4:6). Consequently, in the third *Critique* an immense empirical realm of sensibility and perception had to remain absolutely *a posteriori*.²⁷ Considering Hegel's chapter on "Reason" in the *Phenomenology* in the context of this criticism of Kant shows that "Reason," which results from the transition of the theoretical legislation of nature into the practical legislation of freedom (from "Force and Understanding" to "The Truth of Self-Certainty"), and vice versa (from "Unhappy Consciousness" to "The Certainty and Truth of Reason"), aims to fulfill the 'highest' obligation of demonstrating and justifying the *a priori*, the concept (*Begriff*), of sensuous perceived being through the self-superseding of that finitude which characterizes observing reason until her lowest and thus turning point, that is, until the reduction of the infinite nature of the spiritual self of the subject to its predicates as a finite thing in Phrenology (see below, chapter 5, §2.3; cf. *Enc.* §411Z). In his 1821/22 Lectures on the Philosophy of Nature this unification (*Vereinigung*) of the theoretical and practical consideration of nature – according to which, from the theoretical standpoint, nature is not only *das Seiende* but also *das Meinige*, and from the practical standpoint, nature is not only "the selfless" (*das Selbstlose*), but also "what it is for itself" – constitutes the task itself of philosophy, to solve the problem of the subject–object opposition.²⁸

To sum up the dialectical movement of this section: although reason is in truth only the universality of things, reason tries to possess herself *in natural things* and not in their essentiality *qua talis*; because natural consciousness's knowing takes sensuous things opposed to the "I," it neglects that reason is present in her own proper shape only in the conceptual inwardness of objective thinghood. This is why, at this stage of consciousness, on the one side, reason's sensuous expression cannot be taken essentially as *concept* (*PS* 138.16–22/*M* 146); on the other side, reason 'naturally' moves within what in truth is the mediated unity of single individuals with their (concrete) universals (laws, species, and genera), restlessly ranging from the bad infinity of enumerating differences to "articulate conditions of empty self-identities" (Russon 2004, 122).²⁹

Within this general frame, we can retrace the unifying themes of Hegel's initial assessment of a variety of issues: the Kantian merely reflective approach to determinate nature; his concept of the synthetic unity of apperception with the related theory of sensibility as a modification of the subject and the problematic, negative concept of the *Ding an sich*; the mere assertive and empty value of the immediate certainty of Fichte's "I am I" in relation to the empirical content of knowing, and Fichte's related conception of the *Anstoß*;³⁰ all of these points are collected by Hegel as significant articulations, implications, and consequences of the reflective, intellectual expression of the *very first* ("*erst*" is repeated three times in two lines; *PS* 136.14–16/*M* 144), *abstract* moment of the appearance of the figure of Reason that recognizes herself in externality. The abstract beginning of the certainty of being all reality, endorsed and fixed by idealism, dooms Reason's quest for truth, and raises the problem of how to satisfy the demands of reason and her restless claims to know the world (cf. Lumsden 2003). This is announced at the very beginning of the sub-section on the "Observation of Nature":

But when (*wenn*) reason rummages in the bowels of things and opens all the veins in them in order to be able to spring herself out of them, then (*so*) she will not attain this enjoyment. (*PS* 138.7–9/*M* 146)

This is an important passage: according to Hegel, reason *has* “hands and feet for digging” (contra Jacobi’s quotation of Luke 16:3; *F&K*, *GW* 4:316). Therefore, the *real* ground of reason, which makes her own observations and conducts her own experiments,³¹ is *not* the ground identified by Kant’s account of the heuristic, merely subjectively valid judgments of the infinite natural realm in the *Critique of Judgment*, which lacks objectivity and stability, and lacks categories and subsumptive judgments. Hegel’s polemics in *Faith and Knowledge* (*GW* 4:316) against Kant, Fichte, and Jacobi, for holding that because “the highest Idea does not at the same time have reality,” refuge must be taken in faith *beyond* reason, pertains directly to Hegel’s key issue in “Reason.”³² Hegel’s account of “Reason” in the *Phenomenology* seeks to demonstrate the view of reason Hegel espouses from his early Jena essays right through the *Encyclopedia*: that human self-consciousness, permeating nature with its “veins of objectivity,” can make the realm of nature “stand erect,” as the king in a fairy tale by Goethe who stands up like a fixed and complete figure (*er als aufgerichtete Gestalt steht*). Indeed, in *Faith and Knowledge* Hegel charges metaphorically that Kant’s formal transcendental idealism sucked these veins out of nature, out of the king, so that the upright shape collapses, thus becoming something between “form and lump” (*F&K*, *GW* 4:332).³³

On the other hand, the passage underscores that reason’s demand and quest for meeting and finding herself in the very core of otherness’s objectivity and stability, when she opens the veins injected into nature by self-consciousness, is a hopelessly naive illusion. Indeed, the hopeless inadequacy of thinghood to instantiate directly the universality of thought is not yet recognized. This underscores the ways in which self-consciousness, as reason, is not yet spirit, being yet unable to take the presence of reason in the world according to the form of the concept, and to acknowledge the “impotence” of nature to realize the concept.³⁴

This further implies, first, that idealism has taken “as the truth” what was only an abstract immediate appearance of our rational understanding of the natural world (*PS* 137.8–9/*M* 145), looking for and finding directly expressed in the world the same universality of our own thought (cf. *Enc.* §422*Z*), and, second, that from such a dogmatic move follows the different fates of German Idealism and of Hegel’s phenomenological reason: idealism cannot allow any development and depends on an absolute, uncritical empiricism. Indeed, in order to give filling (*Erfüllung*) to a “mine” that is “void,” the reason of that idealism “needs an extraneous impact, in which first lies the *multiplicity* of sensations or representations” (*PS* 136.20–23/*M* 144). The appearance of phenomenological reason, which for itself is forgetful of, though in itself it is brought about by, the previous dialectical movement, is thus something abstract and formal in respect to her own nature, and therefore is impelled (*treiben*) from her depth *instinctively* to raise its certainty to truth and to fill in its empty “mine” (cf. *PS* 137.13–17/*M* 145; Negele 1991, 80). On my view, although Hegel does not directly say here that idealism

also expresses this paradoxical feature of reason, he had it in mind: recall Hegel's 1802 attitude towards Jacobi, whom he charged with giving to reason only the feeling and consciousness of her "ignorance of the true." In *Faith and Knowledge*, Hegel stressed that Jacobi viewed reason as something subjective though universal (*F&K*, *GW* 4:316), and when infinity appears affected by subjectivity, reason is nothing but an instinct (*F&K* *GW* 4:321). As early as 1802, Kant, Fichte, and Jacobi were already taken as examples of a notion of reason that was "simply and solely directed against the empirical," thus making infinity into something inherently dependent on its relation to empirical finitude (*F&K*, *GW* 4:321).

3 Philosophical Issues: Standard Views and Reappraisals

3.1 The idealism of empiricism

The central philosophical issue in these introductory pages is the proper significance of the idealism of reason. When reason first appears, do we really have Fichte's Ego before us, although we are not yet in Fichte's world (Harris 1997, 1:449; Kojève 1996, 99)? Or are we confronted by idealism as a phenomenon in the history of human consciousness, an idealism that subsequently appeared in abstract form in Kant's and Fichte's philosophies (Hyppolite 1974: 281–4)? Or is Hegel instead presenting the emergence of reason *as* the philosophical position of contemporaneous idealism, thus making the phenomenological development through Unhappy Consciousness *equivalent* to the first statement of Fichte's first *Doctrine of Science* (Kaehler and Marx 1992, 35, 38)? Does Hegel only aim here to come to terms with the history of German Idealism (Bisticas-Cocoves 1998, 163), exposing the weaknesses of this sort of rationalism (Stern 2001, 98ff.)? Moreover, though Hegel does not explicitly refer to Bacon or Descartes, Harris (1997, 1:468) rightly notes that, "We must expect the echoes to go back to the times of Bacon and Descartes; for otherwise there would be an inexplicable gulf between the unmistakable historical references . . . to Luther . . . and the appearance of Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* in 1794."³⁵

The interpretation developed above allows us to elucidate these two related interpretive issues. Our analysis of the contradiction between reason's initial belief and her actual observational activity shows that Hegel does not regard his own appraisal of the (Kantian and Fichtean) idealistic expression of the first appearance of reason, dependent on an absolute empiricism, as equivalent to the result of the dialectic of the Unhappy Consciousness, which constitutes the nature or in itself of reason, governing her becoming. We have seen how Reason first appeared as just the certainty and assurance of being the essentiality (the *Ansich*) of things, that is, of being all reality, by clarifying the significance of her first appearance against the background of the independent authority of the individual subject, the freedom of consciousness, and the vanishing of any alien and transcendent essential

nature of otherness. In the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hegel repeatedly stated that Descartes was the first to claim that thought must start from itself and that the freedom and certainty of itself are contained in the principle of the autonomy of thought, rejecting religious presuppositions, ecclesiastic authority, and conditioning from any external givens.³⁶ Hegel also repeatedly stated, however, that the *cogito's* standpoint is also Fichte's own point of departure.³⁷ In his *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* (1794), Fichte himself acknowledged continuities between his "I am I" and Kant's "I think" in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, together with Descartes's "*cogito, ergo sum*," while also distancing his views from theirs. If Kant failed to establish the transcendental "I" as a fundamental principle, Descartes was a forerunner, because the "*ergo*" did not conclude a syllogism but could be regarded "as an immediate *res facti* (*Tatsache*) of consciousness" (FGA 2:262.11–14). However, in Fichte's view, Descartes stated that if one thinks, one necessarily is, comprehending thought *merely* as a "special" determination of our being, to which other determinations external to thought were also given (FGA 2:262.16–19).

Hegel appears to endorse Fichte's view when he marks the difference between Descartes and Fichte using Fichte's terms. He stresses that for Descartes, after the ego, we find in ourselves also other kinds of thoughts that come from without (MM 20:392/H&S 3:486). For Hegel, Descartes assumes the content of determinate representations empirically; he does not develop determinations such as extension from the "I think," and he does not truly trace them back to thought; he wants only to think, though in fact he takes determinations such as resistance or colors as sensible things. Descartes remains within the limits of subjective, singular consciousness. According to Hegel, what predominates in Descartes is the thinking treatment of the empirical.³⁸ In contrast, Fichte's needs and summonses are viewed as entirely different: Fichte is the first to propound speculative knowledge as the deduction of determinate thoughts from the free development of the concept in a system of thought, where nothing empirical is taken from without.³⁹ Thus it is difficult to maintain that the phenomenological appearance of reason really presents "Fichte's Ego," because Hegel does not state that Reason's initial motto can be equated with Fichte's fundamental proposition that thought is the essence of our being because one thinks *necessarily* if one is (FGA 2:262.16–17). On the contrary, Observing Reason is defined as an *unthinking* consciousness (PS 139.3/M 147), though we should bear in mind a continuity in the *form* of Reason's immediate certainty and assurance between Descartes's "I think" and the theses of German Idealism, to understand Hegel's claim that "idealism" gives direct expression to reason's "I am I."

I propose that Hegel addresses a *common* ground for philosophical consciousness from Descartes to German Idealism's own empty and abstract versions of this stage of cognition, for it appears to me that their lowest common denominator is simply the *general* insight that thought progresses freely in its determinations, making these thought-determinations the intrinsic, objective substantiality of nature.⁴⁰ Furthermore, this interpretation properly includes Bacon's approach and contribution.⁴¹ Consider Bacon's *Novum Organum* (Bk. 1, Aph. 124): "I am

building in the human understanding a true model of the world, such as it is in fact.” Indeed, *pace* Harris, Hegel owned the Frankfurt 1665 edition of Bacon’s *Opera Omnia* (cf. Neuser 1987, 481 entry 14) and in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hegel refers to Bacon in the same terms of independence from authority and tradition he used for Descartes, thus placing Bacon, too, against an historical background characterized by the same themes of the phenomenological transition from “Unhappy Consciousness” to “Reason,” in light of the reconciliation between self and world and the new interest in reality that emerges after the Reformation (MM 20:62–6/H&S 3:158–64). Bacon, Hegel says, looked at the existing world with “open eyes,” restoring and recognizing the value and dignity of its presence, showing the trust of reason in herself and in nature when reason turns to the world, thinking about and finding truth in it (MM 20:77/H&S 3:174). These features clearly fit the interpretation proposed above, and they match Hegel’s sketch in the *Phenomenology* of the emergence of Reason (cf. *VGP* 9:73.77–74.96); hence they should have a proper place in Hegel’s 1807 agenda (see Arndt 2006, 263).

However, this common position was expressly ascribed by Hegel to phenomenological Reason and to idealism, whereas Hegel’s *Lectures* cite Bacon as the leader of the troops of every philosophy of experience (MM 20:74/H&S 3:172; cf. *VGP* 9:73.58, 75.148). At first sight, it seems that Hegel takes Bacon’s empirical philosophy simply as a kind of knowledge drawn from experience which is its sole legitimate source, and therefore opposed to any kind of knowledge that derives from the concept, in other words, opposed to any principle of the autonomous generation of thought from thought, as Hegel saw in Descartes.⁴² When introducing the Modern age in the *Lectures*, Hegel distinguished between a realistic form of philosophizing, for which the objectivity and content of thought arises from perception, proceeding from without, on the part of the object, and an idealistic form of philosophizing that reaches truth through the autonomy of thought, proceeding from within, on the part of the subject.⁴³ To stop with this division, however, would occlude how Hegel regards this *prima facie* contrast between experience and speculation as abstract and one-sided, as if the concept should be ashamed of empirical knowledge and empirical knowledge were devoid of conceptual elements (MM 20:78/H&S 3:175). More importantly, from the contrast between realism and idealism Hegel does *not* draw the conclusion that Bacon’s philosophy depends on an absolute and abstract empiricism of the finite, whose form of activity is restricted to formal identity and which dissolves the concrete given by isolating its distinct features. It also does *not* follow that Bacon’s empiricism amounts to merely recording facts as they accidentally occur. Finally, that contrast does not entail that Bacon’s position is utterly foreign to idealism. Rather, Hegel underscores that experience, *as Bacon understands it*, is methodical inquiry, giving order to thought with regard to things; it is not merely observational, a simple hearing, feeling, and perceiving of particulars, because it essentially aims *to discover universals* in the form of classifications and laws.⁴⁴ Indeed, Hegel appears to ascribe to Bacon an ‘understanding consciousness’, which remains within the limits of finite cognition, though its method is “the concrete way of knowing”

(VGP 9:72.41), consisting “in leaving the concrete as *ground* and making a concrete universal – the *genus*, or force and law – stand out through abstraction from the particularities that seem to be inessential” (*Enc.* §227, cf. Hegel 1992, 184.254–59). On my view, this must not be confused with the first, simple significance of the analytical way of theoretical cognition, which starts with the isolated single being and changes it into the abstract form of a universal: this (Lockean) way takes the given immediate singularity of the perceived “sensible this” as the ground for truth (Hegel 1992, 184.245–46). On the contrary, Bacon is seen to derive *determinations* from an already conceptualized experience, mediated by observations and experiments (VGP 9:77.222–228). In other words, it seems to me that Hegel ascribes to Bacon the standpoint with which he opens the section on reason observing nature: observation requires advancing from perception to thought; a mere perception cannot pass for an observation because what is perceived should at least have the significance of a *universal*, not of a *sensuous particular* (*PS* 139.12–13/*M* 147). In this respect, Bacon’s empiricism looks more advanced than the crude one presupposed and implied by subjective idealism. The counterpart to Hegel’s appreciation of this concrete kind of finite cognition is his criticism of any natural history or empirical science that merely collects individual facts, extraneously determined by chance rather than reason (*Enc.* §16R). The main target of Hegel’s criticism is not empirical science as such, but rather any formal and external method of collecting data, to which Hegel opposes experimental sciences that “make sense,” thanks to the order given to phenomena by “insightful intuition” (*Enc.* §16R; Moretto 2004, 30). It thus appears clear how, due to this ‘concrete universal’ aspect of Bacon’s experimental philosophy, Hegel claims in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* that, despite the *prima facie* opposition between speculation and experience, in natural science realism meets idealism, to the extent that experience seeks to draw universal laws from observations.⁴⁵

From this standpoint, it becomes clear that Hegel’s discussion of the certainty and truth of Reason not only shows us the degree of realism involved in Descartes’s idealism, when, beyond the ego, he finds in himself also other kinds of thoughts that come from without; or that the abstract formalism of German Idealism depends on an absolute empiricism, namely, on a crude, uncritical, extraneous impact to give filling to its empty “mine”; rather, Hegel appears also to point out, conversely, the idealistic side of “concrete” empiricism, which includes not just Bacon, but also Kepler’s laws of planetary orbits. Indeed, consistently from *De orbitis* (1801) to the *Encyclopedia* (1830), Hegel recognized Kepler’s merit in his *empirical* discovery of physical laws through *induction*, extracting from single phenomena their own universal law, assuming in his observational activity the absolute “faith” that reason works in nature.⁴⁶ This is precisely the same instinctive force that ceaselessly drives Reason in the *Phenomenology* (cf. Hegel 1801, 31.21–25/*GW* 5:252.15–18), guiding her search for her presence in nature, though also counteracting any simple satisfaction through any direct mirroring in sensuous things in her immediate certainty, which would lead her to depend upon her relation to externality, as Hegel saw expressed by “idealism.”

In sum, the essential universality to which natural things are necessarily raised insofar as they are thought has been demonstrated to be no mere subjective move of merely heuristic value for our scientific cognition. Empirical data have their own universal expression, and this is actually real in the concrete realm of nature. This was Hegel's conclusion about laws of nature in "Force and Understanding," and neglecting the significance of this conclusion was one of Hegel's central criticisms of "Self-Consciousness." This is also what Hegel indicated in the *Encyclopedia* as the *common* ground of empiricism and philosophy of nature, which can and must make use of the material that physics has developed by drawing from experience, because empirical physics, although it is not comprehending (*begreifende*), speculative cognition, is nevertheless thinking (*denkende*) cognition of nature (*Enc.* §246 & Z).

In showing us the idealistic side of concrete empiricism, the phenomenological reason that emerges from the dialectical consummation of faith in a beyond also links the principle of realism to the movement of the absolute liberation of self-consciousness: "In Empiricism there lies this great principle, that what is true must be in actuality and must be there for our perception" (*Enc.* §38R). For the *Phenomenology*, rational, judicious (*sinnige*)⁴⁷ experience, in which consciousness has its own immediate *presence*, begins by observing the world, freed from the teleological and pseudo-empirical premises of Scholasticism, from the authority of both tradition and religion, from faith in miracles, from superstition, from the uncontrolled individualism of mere argumentation, from the ambiguity and variation of chance, and from the superficiality of mere experience (cf. *VGP* 9:78.242–244). The question, then, is how reason can make good on that great principle found in empiricism.

Notes

- 1 Both this chapter and the following one are based on research conducted in Jena's libraries (March 2005), thanks to the substantial financial support of the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung and funds from the 2004–2006 Italian National Research Project, "Lo studio della 'natura umana' tra filosofia e nuovi campi disciplinari: il caso della Germania e la scienza europea 1790–1830."
- 2 In both this chapter and in the following all translations have been amended by the author, even when translations are cited. The Editor has provided references to H&S and to Sibree (Hegel 1963).
- 3 *PS* 137.29/M 145–6. The same expression, "universal interest," also occurs in parallel passages in which Hegel refers to the sixteenth century (*MM* 12:521/Sibree 439); cf. "The present world was once again present as worthy of spirit's interest" (*MM* 20:62/H&S 3:159).
- 4 See *Phil. Prop.*, *Bewußtseinslehre für die Mittelklasse*, §40/G&V:63.
- 5 The lecture fragment is published in Rosenkranz (1844, 212–14), and reprinted in *GW* 5:473–4. The passage relevant here is *GW* 5:474.5–10. – *Ed.*
- 6 On the direct influence of Rousseau's *Emile* on the young Hegel's conception of human nature (1792/1793–94) and his later philosophical development see de Angelis (1995, 230–75).
- 7 *PS* 491, editorial note to *GW* 9:37.13–15.

- 8 Cf. also the polemics against the monochromatic formalism of any conception of the identity of the Absolute as principle and abstract universality versus the self-determining difference of forms in the becoming of the being-in-itself of things (*PS* 16.22–17.33/M 8–9).
- 9 *PS* 10.12–19, 10.34–11.4, 18.18–28, 19.28–20.25/M 2, 10, 11–12.
- 10 *PS* 138.35–36/M 147. McCumber (1999, 143) holds that Hegel does not really reject the Kantian concept of the in-itself: “rather, he rethinks its relation to experience . . . What he has in mind is the characteristics a thing has that are, indeed, unexperienceable – but only because they are still latent within the thing, have not yet been brought out by its development.”
- 11 See Chiereghin (1997, 26–32); Verra (1999, 43–50).
- 12 Harris (1997, 1:433–6, 447–9); Kimmerle (1978, 288).
- 13 *MM* 12:522/Sibree 440; see also *VGP* 9:63.980–81. In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hegel plays with the double meaning of *eigen*, “singular” and “proper own”: the Lutheran faith, which dispenses with works, is defined in terms of the singular (individual) spirit that self-appropriates the eternal to itself: *der eigene Geist macht sich für sich das Ewige zu eigen* (*MM* 20:63/H&S 3:159; see also *VGP* 9:64.12–15, 70.183–89). On the new kind of human substantiality that emerges from the religious debate of the sixteenth century, see Proß (2000) (on Erasmus, Luther, and Calvin see *ibid.*, 93–102). Hegel refers our appropriation of the external world to Bacon, and our appropriation of our inwardness to Böhme (*VGP* 9:259, editorial note to 70.184–89).
- 14 Note that, contrary to the view influenced also by Gaetano Filangieri that the ideas of human rights and the certainty of freedom were due to the policy pursued by the Enlightened Absolutism of the eighteenth century against religious fanaticism and feudal anarchy, at Hegel’s time the emergence of freedom of thought had been retrospectively retraced to the context of Reformation and the Netherlands’ revolution by Schiller’s 1787 *Don Carlos*, Sc. X, Act III. An implicit issue here is whether the *Phenomenology* is and can be interpreted as a philosophy of history or as a psychology just because its dialectical movements must appeal to forms of consciousness of concrete human subjects. Peperzak (2001, 151–8) carefully distinguishes between “the story of actual individuals” and the elements, dimension or moments of human spirit.
- 15 Stern (2001, 95–6); cf. Pöggeler (1973), Pippin (1993, 52–7).
- 16 In the 1830 *Encyclopedia*’s “Anthropology” (§394Z), we find *das Vernunftige* defined as bringing together that which is separated by the understanding, although this form of the rational is not yet comprehending cognition (*des begreifenden Erkennens*). (On Hegel’s account and critique of “individuality,” see below, chapters 6, 7, and 10. – *Ed.*)
- 17 *PS* 132.29–30/M 139–40; cf. *MM* 12:521/Sibree 440. The point is overlooked by M. Westphal (1998, 97).
- 18 See *MM* 12:521/Sibree 439): “Spirit has now arrived at the stage of thought which contains the reconciliation in its utterly pure essentiality, for it approaches what is external with the demand that it have in it (*in sich*) the same reason as the subject has.” Reconciliation (*Versöhnung*) is a central theme in Hegel’s *Phenomenology*; see the index for references.
- 19 *PS* 15.22–18.2/M 7–9; cf. Maesschalck (2000). This passage also recalls Hegel’s concern with Pyrrhonian Skepticism and *petitio principii*; see above, pp. 2–3, 9, 60–64. – *Ed.*
- 20 Note that already in *Faith and Knowledge* for Hegel “idealism” (Kant’s task) meant that thought was objective (see Baum 1989, 198ff.). On the philosophical, essential distinction between the concept of truth and mere certainty, see *Enc.* §416Z.
- 21 *L&M* (*GW* 7:83): “a *one*, taken up in universality, expresses itself as allness, and the judgment ‘All A are B’ . . . determines the subject equally well as negative one and also

as something universal. This restoration of particularity in universality itself, however, is not a positing of what the subject as such is. The subject should be on its own account, and precisely as subject. Yet as allness it is in fact not subject but has the universality of a predicate and is something particular simply and solely in this connection with it.”

- 22 See the entire argument of *PS* 41.24–44.37/M 35–9.
- 23 This self-conception echoes that of the initial forms of Self-Consciousness; see above, chapter 1. – *Ed.*
- 24 According to Harris (1997, 1:456), Spinoza’s *Ethics* is the paradigm of the certainty of reason of being all reality, having it implicitly within itself.
- 25 See Kaehler and Marx (1992, 35–7), Düsing (1993, 250–6), Harris (1997, 1:449, 452–5), Stern (2001, 98ff.)
- 26 *PS* 190.36–191.2/M 208–9; cf. K. R. Westphal (1989, 165) and Harris (1997, 1:462–5).
- 27 See parallel passages in *F&K* (*GW* 4:332–3) and *MM* 20:376/H&S 3:476–7.
- 28 See Bonsiepen (1985, 9). On the point cf. Wahsner (1996, 23–4).
- 29 Cf. *PS* 136.6–9/M 144 and Hegel’s Introduction (*PS* 54.30–55.30/M 49–50).
- 30 See *PS* 498, editorial notes to 133.6–9, 137.4–7.
- 31 This sense of a strategy really pursued by reason is overlooked by Miller’s rendering of “*wenn*” with the hypothetical “even if” (M 146), which omits Hegel’s attention to time in this passage. Also, he does not translate “*so*,” thus missing Hegel’s construction “*wenn . . . so*,” which parallels the subsequent unambiguously temporal phrase “*vorher . . . dann*” (*PS* 138.10/M 146).
- 32 On Jacobi’s rejection of the possibility of a philosophical scientific knowing that grasps the quality of natural existence, the sole genuine scientific method being the analytical one of mathematics and logic, see Verra (1976, 52–3).
- 33 Compare two parallel passages from *Faith and Knowledge*: “Objectivity and stability (*Halt*) derive solely from the categories . . . For the cognition (*Erkenntnis*) of nature, without the veins injected into nature by self-consciousness, there remains nothing but sensation” (*F&K*, *GW* 4:332); “But nature is not just something fixed (*fest*) and complete (*fertig*) on its own account, which could therefore subsist even without spirit” (*Enc.* §96Z).
- 34 See Lacroix (1997, 42–61), Collins (2000), Marmasse (2003), Ferrini (2004).
- 35 In Harris’s view (1997, 1:470, note 8), however, this echo of Bacon would be based on second-hand knowledge.
- 36 *MM* 20:126, 130, 134–5/*H&S* 3:224, 227–8, 231–2. See also *VGP* 9:92.676–83.
- 37 *MM* 20:130, 132, 394/*H&S* 3:228, 230, 485. In Hegel’s view, Descartes and Fichte share the same starting point, though only Fichte sought to develop all the determinations from the “I,” from what is absolutely certain (*MM* 20:132/*H&S* 3:230; cf. *VGP* 9:93.719–21). Hegel (*Enc.* §64R) writes that Descartes’s statements on the very first nature of the simple conscious intuition of the *cogito*, of the inseparability of my being and my thought, are “so eloquent and precise that the modern theses of Jacobi and others about this immediate connection can only count as superfluous repetitions.” When retracing theoretical continuities between modern and contemporary thought in 1802, Hegel regards Kant’s “formal” idealism as a development of Locke’s empiricism (*F&K*, *GW* 4:333; see Nuzzo (2003, 83–8); cf. also *Enc.* §40). From this standpoint, it is worth noting that in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hegel criticizes Kant’s notion of experience, objecting that, in Kant’s view, ‘experience’ or ‘observation’ (*Betrachtung*) of the world can have no other meaning than to state that “here is a candlestick, there a snuff-box (*Tabackdose*)” (*MM* 20:352/*H&S* 3:444–5). The same point is made, using the same word, *Tabackdose*, in *PS* 139.10–11/M 147, when Hegel writes that also the unthinking consciousness that declares observation and experience to be the ground for truth “will not let, e.g. the perception that this

- penknife lies alongside this snuff-box, pass for an observation” (see below, chapter 5, §1.1).
- 38 MM 20:126, 130–1, 132, 146, 151/H&S 3:224, 227–8, 229, 241, 246; cf. *VGP* 9:95.784–96.802, 99.903–8, 100.956–58.
- 39 MM 20:132, 153, 391–2/H&S 3:228, 248, 485.
- 40 See above, pp. 55–58, for discussion of Hegel’s account of thought; also see Houlgate (2005, 78). – *Ed.*
- 41 Pinkard (1994, 80–1, 327–73 note 6); Forster (1998, 327).
- 42 Endorsing what Popper called the “myth of Bacon” in his *Conjectures and Refutations* (1963), neo-positivists and epistemologists have often taken Bacon as a mere empiricist, who grounded scientific discoveries only on facts and mere observations, regarding theories as superfluous and misleading. Nisbet (1972, 26–30) has shown how this reading was anticipated by Goethe, soon after the publication of the *Phenomenology*. Rossi (1986, 98–117) strongly criticizes Popper’s (and Lakatos’s) interpretation, by stressing the theoretical implications of Bacon’s notion of experience.
- 43 MM 20:77–9/H&S 3:175–6. In the post-Kantian debate, realism was a view that assigned to the intellect in itself (*an sich*) no other specific property than a pure receptivity, while idealism raised the question whether in the human intellect a pure cognition is given, and whether space and time are the forms of sensibility (see Wrede 1791, §1:6–7). Hegel also finds the finitude of cognition in representations of the material as something given and of the intellect as *tabula rasa* (*Enc.* §226Z).
- 44 Cf. MM 20:79/H&S 3:176; *VGP* 9:77.222–28; *Enc.* §38. Hegel’s appreciation of the conceptual features of Bacon’s attitude towards experience can be easily retraced in many aphorisms of Book 1 of the *Novum Organum*, such as Aph. 82 (for the notion of *experientia ordinata* and *bene condita* in contrast to *casus et experientia vaga et incondita*); Aph. 95 (for the rational aspect of a genuine experimental philosophy); Aph. 98 (for the methodical requirements of the genuine empirical inquiry: verification, enumeration, pondering, measuring); Aph. 102 (for the disposition and coordination in tables of the collected empirical material). See also Book 2, Aph. 1, where the task and aim of science is the discovery of the *Form* of nature, which in Aph. 2 is defined as the *law* according to which the qualities gather themselves in things. (Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Bacon’s aphorisms are to Book 1; also see the later references to the notion of form in Book 2 elucidated in *VGP* 9:268–9, editorial note to 77.225–28).
- 45 MM 20:67–8/H&S 3:163–4.
- 46 *Enc.* §270Z, cf. §21Z and §422Z, where Hegel says that the third of Kepler’s laws is to be grasped according to the internal necessary unity of its determinations (space and time) only by the speculative thought of reason (*Vernunft*); at the same time, however, he stresses that this law was already (*schon*) discovered by the “understanding consciousness” (*verständigen Bewußtsein*) in the multiplicity of appearances, for the laws are the determinations of the *Verstand* that inhabits the world itself, in which the understanding consciousness finds its own nature and takes itself as object.
- 47 “*Sinnig*” means “sensible,” as the English say, meaning “making good sense” rather than nonsense.

References

- Angelis, M. de (1995) *Die Rolle des Einflusses von J. J. Rousseau auf die Herausbildung von Hegels Jugendideal. Ein Versuch, die “dunklen Jahre” (1789–1792) der Jugendentwicklung Hegels zu erhellen*. Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang.
- Arndt, A. (2006) “Idealismus,” in P. Cobbes et al. (eds.), *Hegel-Lexicon* (pp. 262–64). Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft.

- Baum, M. (1989) *Die Entstehung der Hegelschen Dialektik*, 2nd ed. Bonn: Bouvier.
- Beiser, F. (2002) *German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism 1781–1801*. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Bisticas-Cocoves, M. (1998) “The Path of Reason in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit,” in D. Köhler and O. Pöggeler (eds.), *G. W. F. Hegel: Phänomenologie des Geistes* (pp. 163–82). Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
- Bonsiepen, W. (1985) “Hegels Raum-Zeit-Lehre. Dargestellt anhand zweier Vorlesungsnachschriften,” *Hegel-Studien* 20: 39–61.
- Chiereghin, F. (1994) *La “Fenomenologia dello spirito” di Hegel. Introduzione alla lettura*. Roma: La Nuova Italia Scientifica.
- Chiereghin, F. (1997) “Gli anni di Jena e la *Fenomenologia*,” in C. Cesa (ed.), *Hegel. Fenomenologia, Logica, Filosofia della natura, Morale, Politica, Estetica, Religione, Storia* (pp. 3–37). Roma-Bari: Laterza.
- Collins, A. B. (2000) “Hegel’s Unresolved Contradiction: Experience, Philosophy, and the Irrationality of Nature,” *Dialogue* 39: 771–96.
- Düsing, K. (1993) “Der Begriff der Vernunft in Hegels *Phänomenologie*,” in H. F. Fulda and R.-P. Horstmann (eds.), *Vernunftbegriffe in der Moderne* (pp. 245–60). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Ferrini, C. (2004). “Being and Truth in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature,” *Hegel-Studien* 37: 69–90.
- Forster, M. N. (1998) *Hegel’s Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hansen, F.-P. (1994) *Hegels “Phänomenologie des Geistes.”* Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
- Harris, H. S. (1997) *Hegel’s Ladder*, Vol. I: *The Pilgrimage of Reason*. Cambridge, Mass.: Hackett Publishing Co.
- Harris, H. S. (1999) “Hegel’s Intellectual Development to 1807,” in F. C. Beiser (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel* (pp. 25–51). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (rpt. 1st ed. 1993).
- Hegel, G. W. F. (1801) *Dissertatio philosophica de orbitis planetarum*. Jena: Prager.
- Hegel, G. W. F. (1963) *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, tr. J. Sibree. London: Bell & Daldy (1872); rpt. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Hegel, G. W. F. (1992) *Vorlesungen über Logik und Metaphysik. Heidelberg 1817. Mitgeschrieben von F. A. Good*, ed. K. Gloy et al. Hamburg: F. Meiner.
- Houlgate, S. (2005) *An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Hyppolite, J. (1974) *Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit*, tr. S. Cherniak and J. Heckman. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Kaehler, K. E. and W. Marx (1992) *Die Vernunft in Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann.
- Kalenberg, T. (1997) *Die Befreiung der Natur. Natur und Selbstbewußtsein in der Philosophie Hegels*. Hamburg: F. Meiner.
- Kimmerle, H. (1978). *Sein und Selbst. Untersuchung zur kategorialen Einheit von Vernunft und Geist in Hegels “Phänomenologie des Geistes.”* Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann.
- Kojève, A. (1996) *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel. Leçons sur la Phénoménologie de l’Esprit professées de 1933 à 1939*. (Originally published 1947.) Italian trans. by G. F. Frigo. Milano: Adelphi.
- Lacroix, A. (1997) *Hegel. La philosophie de la nature*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Lumsden, S. (2003) “Satisfying the Demands of Reason: Hegel’s Conceptualization of Experience,” *Topoi* 22: 41–53.
- Marmasse, G. (2003) “La philosophie de la nature dans l’*Encyclopédie* de Hegel,” *Archives de Philosophie* 66: 211–36.

- McCumber, J. (1999) "Schiller, Hegel and the Aesthetics of German Idealism," in M. Baur and D. O. Dahlstrom (eds.), *The Emergence of German Idealism* (pp. 133–46). Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press.
- Maesschalck, M. (2000) "Construction et réduction. Le conflit des philosophies de la nature chez Fichte et Schelling entre 1801 et 1806," in O. Bloch (ed.), *Philosophies de la nature* (pp. 217–26). Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne.
- Moretto, A. (2004) *Filosofia della matematica e della meccanica nel sistema hegeliano*, 2nd ed. Verona: Il Poligrafo.
- Negele, M. (1991) *Grade der Freiheit. Versuch einer Interpretation von G. W. F. Hegels "Phänomenologie des Geistes."* Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
- Neuser, W. (1987) "Die naturphilosophische und naturwissenschaftliche Literatur aus Hegels privater Bibliothek," in M. J. Petry (ed.), *Hegel und die Naturwissenschaften* (pp. 479–99). Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
- Nicolai, F. (1801) *Ueber die Art wie vermittelt des transcendentalen Idealismus ein wirklich existirendes Wesen aus Principien konstruirt werden kann.* Berlin and Stettin (n.p.).
- Nisbet, H. B. (1972) *Goethe and the Scientific Tradition.* London: Institute of Germanic Studies/University of London.
- Nuzzo, A. (2003) "Sinnliche und übersinnliche Erkenntnis. Das Problem des Empirismus in Hegels *Glauben und Wissen*," in K. Vieweg and B. Bowman (eds.), *Wissen und Begründung. Die Skeptizismus-Debatte um 1800 im Kontext neuzeitlicher Wissenskonzeptionen. Kritisches Jahrbuch der Philosophie* 8, pp. 75–92.
- Peperezak, A. (2001) *Modern Freedom. Hegel's Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy.* Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Pinkard, T. (1994) *Hegel's Phenomenology. The Sociality of Reason.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pippin, R. (1993) "You Can't Get There from Here: Transition Problems in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*," in F. C. Beiser (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Hegel* (pp. 52–85). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pöggeler, O. (1973) "Die Komposition der *Phänomenologie des Geistes*," in H. F. Fulda and D. Henrich (eds.), *Materialen zu Hegels "Phänomenologie des Geistes"* (pp. 329–90). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Proß, W. (2000) "Le péché et la constitution du sujet à la Renaissance," *Rue Descartes* 27: 79–116.
- Rosenkranz, K. (1844) *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Leben beschrieben durch Karl Rosenkranz.* Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
- Rossi, P. (1986) *I ragni e le formiche. Un'apologia della storia della scienza.* Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Rousseau, J.-J. (1969) *Emile ou de l'Education*, in B. Gagnebin and M. Raymond (eds.), Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Oeuvres Complètes*, IV. Paris: Gallimard.
- Russon, J. (2004). *Reading Hegel's Phenomenology.* Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Stern, R. (2001). *Hegel and the Phenomenology of Spirit.* London: Routledge.
- Verra, V. (1976) "La qualità nell'età romantica," in E. R. Lorch (ed.), *La qualità* (pp. 51–62; discussion: 63–77). Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Verra, V. (1999) *Introduzione a Hegel*, 9th ed. Roma-Bari: Laterza.
- Wahsner, R. (1996) *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Naturphilosophie. Über ihren Sinn im Lichte der heutigen Naturerkenntnis.* Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang.
- Westphal, K. R. (1989) *Hegel's Epistemological Realism. A Study of the Aim and Method of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.* Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Westphal, M. (1998) *History & Truth in Hegel's Phenomenology*, 3rd ed. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Wrede, E. G. F. (1791) *Antilogie des Realismus und Idealismus. Zur nähern Prüfung der ersten Grundsätze des Leibnizischen und Kantischen Denksystems.* Halle: Francke und Bispink.

Further Reading

- Americks, K. (2000) "Introduction: Interpreting German Idealism," in K. Americks (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism* (pp. 1–17). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Becker, W. (1971) *Hegels "Phänomenologie des Geistes." Eine Interpretation* (pp. 78–81). Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer.
- Bonsiepen, W. (1981) "Zu Hegels Auseinandersetzung mit Schellings Naturphilosophie in der 'Phänomenologie des Geistes'," in L. Hasler (ed.), *Schelling. Seine Bedeutung für eine Philosophie der Natur und Geschichte* (pp. 167–72). Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
- Buhr, M. (1984) "Absolute Vernunft – ein Oxymoron? Zum Verhältnis von absoluter und historischer Vernunft," in D. Henrich and R.-P. Horstmann (eds.), *Hegels Logik der Philosophie. Religion und Philosophie in der Theorie des absoluten Geist* (pp. 99–105). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Doz, A. (1993) "La distinction hégélienne de raison et entendement est-elle éclairante pour nous aujourd'hui?," in H. F. Fulda and R.-P. Horstmann (eds.), *Vernunftbegriffe in der Moderne* (pp. 237–44). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Falke G.-H. H. (1996) *Begriffene Geschichte. Das historische Substrat und die systematische Anordnung der Bewusstseinsgestalten in Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes. Interpretation und Kommentar* (pp. 160–94). Berlin: Lukas Verlag.
- Hartmann, N. (1929) *Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, II: Hegel*. Berlin and Leipzig: W. de Gruyter.
- Horstmann, R.-P. (2003). "Den Verstand zur Vernunft bringen? Hegels Auseinandersetzung mit Kant in the *Differenzschrift*," in W. Welsch and K. Vieweg (eds.), *Das Interesse des Denkens. Hegels aus heutiger Sicht* (pp. 89–108). München: W. Fink.
- Kohl, E. (2003) "Gestalt." *Untersuchungen zu einem Grundbegriff in Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes* (pp. 137–45). München: H. Utz.
- Nuzzo, A. (1993) "Vernunft und Verstand – Zu Hegels Theorie des Denkens," in H. F. Fulda and R.-P. Horstmann (eds.), *Vernunftbegriffe in der Moderne* (pp. 261–85). Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- Pinkard, T. (2000) "Hegel's Phenomenology and Logic: An Overview," in K. Americks (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism* (pp. 161–79). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Scheier, C.-A. (1986) *Analytischer Kommentar zu Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes* (pp. 148–64). Freiburg and München: K. Alber.
- Solomon, R. C. (1983) *In the Spirit of Hegel. A Study of G. W. F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (pp. 301–T411). New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Valenza, P. (1999) *Logica e filosofia pratica nello Hegel di Jena* (pp. 203–97). Padova: Cedam.
- Vetö, M. (1998) *Etudes sur l'idéalisme allemand* (pp. 11–24). Paris: L'Harmattan.
- Vinci, P. (1999) "Coscienza infelice" e "Anima bella." *Commentario alla Fenomenologia dello spirito di Hegel*. Milano: Guerini & Ass.